

Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi, al-Qaida's henchman in Iraq and the architect of the brutal attacks against U.S. military personnel and Iraqi civilians alike. We can be justifiably proud, and should be, of how the United States and Iraqi forces, together, carried out this extremely dangerous and important mission. It is also a positive development that the Iraqi Government is now at its full capacity, with all Cabinet positions filled, particularly the critical national security posts. That is the good news. It is important to cite that as well.

Now that this Government of Iraq is a reality, it is also an important and appropriate moment for U.S. policymakers to take stock of our policy in Iraq and consider the next steps to turning over full responsibility to Iraq's democratically elected government.

Let me remind our colleagues, last year, President Bush signed into law as part of the fiscal year 2006 Defense Authorization Act a provision that states:

Calendar year 2006 should be a period of significant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty, with Iraqi security forces taking the lead for the security of a free and sovereign Iraq, thereby creating the conditions for the phased redeployment of United States forces from Iraq.

I commend, as I should have at the outset, the chairman of the committee, my good friend from Virginia, JOHN WARNER. He has done a wonderful job allowing debate in the committee, bringing witnesses forward, allowing dissent to occur where appropriate, and authoring this language last year in that Defense authorization bill which the President signed into law calling for this year to be a year of transition. Those words were important. They were not crafted in a cavalier fashion; they were put together carefully in a bipartisan fashion as a message to the American people and to the Iraqi people and their Government. This year—2006—would be a year of transition for Iraq's leaders to assume greater responsibility over security matters and other challenges facing their country.

There have now been national elections in Iraq. A permanent broad-based government has been formed. It is important that the Iraqis now take on a significant role in establishing domestic security. Ultimately, a solution in Iraq will not be achieved through U.S. military action alone but, rather, through the political will and substantive action on the part of the new Iraqi Government to bring various factions in their country together.

In short, the future of Iraq ultimately rests with the Iraqi people, not with U.S. military might, not with the size of our treasury, but on the resolve of the Iraqi people and their leaders. That is where their future rests. Let's be clear however about our role in that process.

We should continue to assist this nascent Government in Iraq during these difficult times. But at the same

time, we must also refocus the nature of that assistance if we are going to succeed and if Iraq is going to succeed. Iraq's problems are essentially political problems that call out for political solutions. It is becoming increasingly evident, I think to all of us, that a continuing substantial U.S. troop presence in and around Iraqi cities is not the answer at all. In fact, the road to any success in Iraq will be contingent on a lessening of U.S. military presence, if, in fact, the U.S. Ambassador is right in his message to our Secretary of State. And having visited Iraq on two occasions I believe he is right.

We have won the larger war against Iraq's dictator but at no small cost. It has been a successful effort in that regard. Saddam has been toppled and is on trial. A new democratically elected Iraqi Government is now in place. Al-Zarqawi has been killed. Those are successes.

The remaining mission, however, of stabilizing Iraq and bringing factions together is something that can only be done by Iraq's new Government and its citizens. An indefinite and prolonged U.S. troop presence in that country is quickly reaching a point of diminishing returns.

I am a realist and an optimist. I recognize American involvement in Iraq and the gulf region will be required for years to come. It is a very important neighborhood in which we have very important interests. It is a dangerous neighborhood, as well. And we have vital national interests at stake there. But we have other important global interests, as well; among these combating the threat of global terrorism and terrorist organizations. Global terrorism is and remains our greatest threat.

In that context, I don't think it is unpatriotic or otherwise inappropriate for the supporters of the pending amendment to ask President Bush to tell the American people, tell the U.S. Congress, when and how he plans to successfully conclude the U.S. military presence in Iraq so that U.S. forces can be redeployed to more effectively combat global terrorism and protect our vital national interests.

Why was it reasonable and appropriate for the administration to set deadlines for Iraqis and unreasonable to set deadlines for itself? The Bush administration set a deadline for the establishment of an interim government, a deadline for writing a Constitution and for holding a referendum to approve it, and a deadline for holding elections for a permanent Iraqi government. Guess what. It worked. The Iraqi political leadership met the challenges. It wasn't always easy and the process wasn't perfect, but it produced results because we insisted upon those deadlines. In fact, I would argue had we not set deadlines, I believe we would be facing a very different picture in Iraq today.

I believe U.S. interests in Iraq can be advanced by developing benchmarks

and a timeframe for getting done what needs to be done to produce the success we all need and want in Iraq. I don't mean to suggest that U.S. forces should in any way be precipitously redeployed from Iraq next week or next month—that would be a mistake, in my view—but I do believe it is imperative for planning purposes to think about benchmarks and a realistic timeframe within which U.S. force levels can be significantly reduced below the current level of 130,000.

The benchmarks are fairly obvious: a unity government that equitably represents the interests of and distributes resources to all sectors of Iraq; professionalism of Iraq's security and police forces; disbanding of sectarian militias; the creation of a gulf regional security umbrella to enhance stability and deter unwanted interference by Iraqi's neighbors; and greater international participation and resources in Iraq's reconstruction agenda.

These are all obvious and necessary benchmarks. The more quickly the benchmarks are realized, the more hopeful we can be for Iraq's future.

It is both realistic and, in my view, possible to achieve these benchmarks within the next 12 to 18 months. Whether we achieve them depends on the determination of the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi people to assume responsibility for their shared future—not on the military might of the United States.

And in conjunction with such progress, I think it is also realistic and possible to undertake the phased strategic redeployment of our forces from Iraq to other nations in the gulf and to other regions posing significant terrorist threats to our country. The details of any redeployment should appropriately be left to our military commanders on the ground to work out, in consultation with Iraqi leaders. This is a very critical and central point. Let me repeat it. The details of any redeployment should be appropriately left to our military commanders on the ground to work out, in consultation with Iraqi leaders. But we must no longer remain in an open-ended commitment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 1 additional minute.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield 1 additional minute to the Senator.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DODD. The Iraqis are going to have to take responsibility for their future. This, in my view, is a strategy for success in Iraq. This is a reasoned and responsible approach. It is realistic. This is not cut-and-run. The alternative is for more of the same, in my view—endless occupation, violence, instability, and the erosion of America's global leadership and national security.

I do not underestimate the challenges facing the Iraqi people. They